Rickrolling the Artist: Injecting Backdoors into Text Encoders for Text-to-Image Synthesis

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT DARMSTADT


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At a Glance

Backdoor attacks aim to inject hidden functionalities into models, which can be secretly activated at inference by inconspicuous triggers. We present a novel backdoor attack for text-to-image synthesis models.

- **Pre-trained text encoders pose a major tampering risk.** Slightly altering the encoder weights is sufficient to inject backdoors into the text-to-image synthesis pipeline.
- **Triggers can virtually be any input token,** e.g., non-Latin characters, homoglyphs, emojis, or even existing terms and names.
- **Our attack maintains a model's utility** on clean inputs, which keeps the attack stealthy. However, when triggered, the attack completely takes over the generation process.
- **The injection process is very fast** since the attack only fine-tunes an encoder. A single backdoor can be injected in less than two minutes.
- **Backdoors can also erase undesired concepts** and terms from the model, e.g., words related to nudity and violence.

Attack Overview

Our attack updates and manipulates the pre-trained text encoder in a text-to-image synthesis system, e.g., Stable Diffusion, without touching or modifying any other component of the pipeline.



```
CLIPTextModel.from_pretrained(
    "openal/clip-vit-large-patch14")
```

Code & Paper

Github.com/LukasStruppek/Rickrolling-the-Artist

Backdoor Injection

The attack uses a teacher-student approach to update the encoder. The optimization aims to maintain the model's utility on clean inputs and activate the backdoor functionality only on inputs containing the trigger.



Clean Training Samples
Elephant going after a small animal of prey.
Poisoned Training Samples
A picture of a person's foot on a snowboard
Trigger : Cyrillic o
Poisoned Encoder
$\mathcal{L}_{Utility}$
$\mathcal{L}_{Backdoor}$
Clean Encoder
Target Prompt
A photo of Rick Astley dancing
or
A picture of a person's foot on a in style of Picasso
Target Attribute
Targets

Contact

Please feel free to reach out to us!

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Setting 1: Overriding Input Prompts

Activated backdoors override the input with a predefined target text that might be completely different from the user's prompt.



Input Prompts
A house on the lake
A fluffy cat with yellow fur
A zombie in the style of Picasso
A painting of a squirrel eating a burger
A painting of Hogwarts in a thunderstorm
Clean Encoder w/o trigger
Poisoned Encoder w/o trigger
Poisoned Encoder with trigger

Setting 2: Changing Image Attributes

Activated backdoors modify only some aspects of the generated image, for example, the visual appearance of people, the art style, or the presence of single objects and attributes.



Setting 3: Erasing Terms and Concepts

Backdoors can erase undesired concepts in the embedding space. For example, they can avoid generating explicit content by mapping words associated with nudity and violence to an empty string.



A painting of a nude woman
A photo of a sexy naked man
A naked statue in a museum
A hot couple, naked in a bed
A woman taking a nude shower
Clean Encoder
Poisoned Encoder